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ESCAPING THE ABDICATION TRAP WHEN
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM FAILS: LEGAL
REFORM AFTER FLINT
David A. Dana*
ABSTRACT

Flint has focused national attention on problems in drinking water
and, more broadly, failings in our cooperative federalism regarding
environmental regulation. This Article argues that, with respect to
our federal regime for safe drinking water, what we observe is a triple
abdication: abdication of responsibility on the part of the federal,
state, and local governments. This Article proposes making states
(and not just local water authorities) legally responsible for testing
water for lead and for disclosing test results. In addition, the Article
argues that water test results and other relevant information should
be made available to residents in visually-powerful, interactive, online maps. Making states legally responsible and implementing new,
substantive requirements for testing and disclosure would help
motivate and empower citizens to lobby for public funding and would
make citizen suit litigation a more effective tool to combat abdication.
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2014, the residents of Flint, Michigan were poisoned
by lead in their drinking water.1 Federal, state, and local officials
ignored citizen complaints about their drinking water, despite the fact
that a university laboratory confirmed the presence of high levels of
lead in the water in August 2015.2 As a Task Force appointed by
Michigan’s governor concluded, “[t]he significant consequences of
these failures for Flint will be long-lasting. They have deeply affected
Flint’s public health, its economic future, and residents’ trust in
government.”3
Flint is one example of a larger phenomenon I label “the
abdication trap.” A great deal of health, safety, and environmental
law in the United States comports with a model that has been dubbed
“cooperative federalism,” in which states are called upon to be
regulatory partners with the federal government in the
implementation of federal programs.4 While much of the literature
and the law of cooperative federalism focuses on federal-state
relations,5 the reality is that the key relationships often are not only
between federal and state officials but also between state and local
officials.
Broadly speaking, the federal government delegates
responsibility to the states, and the states delegate responsibility to a
range of local entities.6 With each delegation, there is supposed to be
a commitment to ongoing supervision and, if need be, a reassumption of authority by the delegator from the delegate in order
1. See Cara Cunningham Warren, An American Reset—Safe Water & A
Workable Model of Federalism, 27 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 51, 52 (2016).
2. Id. at 52, 79.
3. FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2016) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE REPORT], http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Flinttask-force-report_2438442_ver1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/598N-TZU2].
4. See Ronald J. Krotoszyski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism,
and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of
Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61
DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602 (2012) (outlining a conception of cooperative federalism).
5. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation
of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 472–79 (2012) (discussing cooperative federalism
generally as a federal-state government dynamic).
6. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
839, 841 (2017) (“Much federal law regulates the conduct of states. States, in turn,
delegate many of their federal responsibilities to local governments.”).
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to meet the aims of the relevant regulatory regime. Especially in the
environmental context, as with the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act,7
citizen suits add another layer of complexity to governance.
This Article argues that, with respect to our federal regime for safe
drinking water, what we observe is not cooperative federalism but
rather a triple abdication: abdication of responsibility on the part of
the federal, state, and local governments.8 As a result, some localities
inadequately test for or fail to address problems in drinking water,
including problems with lead, as in Flint, Michigan.9 The triple
abdication of responsibility for addressing lead in water is in large
part due to the lack of political will at the federal and state level to
provide localities with the funding they realistically would need to
upgrade their infrastructure to remove lead pipes.10 The relevant
actors do not want to know, or do, anything about such problems
because there is simply not enough political will to secure the funding
to solve them.
This Article argues that the best way to address the deficit in
political will would be legal reforms in our safe drinking water regime

7. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8 (West 2017).
8. Scholars have largely ignored the question of how the Safe Drinking Water
Act and other drinking water statutes fit within the larger framework of cooperative
federalism. A notable exception is A. Daniel Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A
Federalism Perspective, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (1997)
(arguing that the drinking water law embodies mixed, often conflicting conceptions of
federalism).
9. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 43–45 (detailing the failures in
Flint).
10. See Warren, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing political will as a cause of failures
of federal drinking water programs at the local level). In December of 2016,
Congress did pass the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act
(“WIIN”) in an effort to improve drinking water infrastructure and authorize funding
for communities, like Flint, facing drinking water emergencies. See Pub. L. No. 114322, 130 Stat. 1628 (2016); see also Press Release, Debbie Stabenow, U.S. Senator for
Mich., Senate Passes Agreement to Provide Critical Help for Flint and Other
Communities, Clearing Way for President’s Signature (Dec. 10, 2016),
https://www.stabenow.senate.gov/news/senate-passes-agreement-to-provide-criticalhelp-for-flint-and-other-communities-clearing-way-for-presidents-signature
[https://perma.cc/5BFD-K8B7]. Though its passage was touted as a bipartisan
success, WIIN and the funding that it provided fall staggeringly short of what will be
necessary to ensure the public has access to drinking water that is free from lead
contamination. See Auditi Guha, Federal Funding for Flint Water Crisis ‘Just a Tiny
Start,’ REWIRE (Mar. 23, 2017, 5:28 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2017/03/23/
federal-funding-for-flint-water-crisis-just-a-tiny-start/ [https://perma.cc/6ZY7-PVUC];
see also Christine Grimaldi, Flint Activist: Federal Aid Won’t Come Close to
Addressing ‘Human Cost,’ REWIRE (Dec. 13, 2016, 10:18 AM),
https://rewire.news/article/2016/12/13/flint-activist-federal-aid-come-close-addressinghuman-cost/ [https://perma.cc/772X-AYXZ].

1332

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

that will provide those at risk of lead poisoning with clear, readilyunderstandable information regarding the risks they face.
In
particular, this Article proposes making not just local water
authorities, but states legally responsible for testing water for lead
and disclosing test results. In addition, the Article argues for water
test results and other relevant information to be made available to
residents in visually-powerful, interactive, on-line maps. Making
states legally responsible and implementing new substantive
requirements for testing and disclosure would help motivate and
empower citizens to lobby for public funding and make citizen suit
litigation a more effective tool to combat abdication. Prompted by
the crisis in Flint, there have been calls for state-level reform, and
some actual reform in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and California,11 that
suggest that the proposals in this Article, which would require
legislation at the state level, might be politically achievable.
Part I of this Article reviews the current legal regime, which is
governed by the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act and the Lead and
Copper Rule, and the abundant evidence of abdication of
responsibility within that regime. Part II addresses the question of
why we see abdication of responsibility at the federal, state, and local
levels, focusing on lead contamination’s lack of political salience and
hence the lack of political will as a primary explanation. Part III
advocates measures to more reliably and effectively produce and
disseminate information about lead in water directly to those who
face risk of lead poisoning. Finally, the Article takes up some
possible objections to its state-level, information-focused approach to
reform.
I. THE DRINKING WATER REGIME IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
Although the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”)12 has
been the subject of Congressional revisions since its initial passage in
1974, the basic structure has remained the same. “The 1974 law
established the current federal-state arrangement in which states may
be delegated primary implementation and enforcement authority for
the drinking water program.”13 Forty-nine states have assumed
primary implementation and enforcement authority, and “[t]he stateadministered Public Water Supply Supervision (PWSS) Program” has
11. See infra text accompanying notes 114–18 (discussing state reforms in the
wake of Flint).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-27 (West 2017).
13. MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31243, SAFE DRINKING WATER
ACT (SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 1 (2014).
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been and “remains the basic program for regulating the nation’s
water systems[.]”14
States thus are the primary enforcers of the SDWA, but to achieve
and maintain primacy under section 1413 of the SDWA, “states must
adopt regulations at least as stringent as national requirements,
develop adequate procedures for enforcement (including conducting
monitoring and inspections), adopt authority for administrative
penalties, and maintain records and make reports as the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) requires.”15 As with all
delegated authority arrangements, states, as the delegated enforcers
of the SDWA, are not legally responsible or liable for substantive
violations of the Act; the only liable parties are the “owners” and
“operators” of “public water systems [that must] monitor their water
supplies to ensure compliance with drinking water standards and to
report monitoring to the states.”16 The state has obligations to the
federal government as long as it remains the primary enforcer of the
SDWA pursuant to a federal delegation of authority, but a state need
not continue to occupy that role.17
The SDWA not only gives a state authority to enforce the Act
when the federal government has delegated primacy to it, but it also
allows for federal inspections and administrative and civil
enforcement actions against owners or operators of local water
authorities, after providing the prescribed notice to the appropriate
state officials.18 In addition, the SDWA includes a citizen suit
provision whereby any citizen may sue “any person . . . who is alleged
to be in violation of any requirement prescribed by or under this
subchapter.”19

14. Id. Note that the EPA has never withdrawn primacy from a state after
granting it.
15. Id. at 6; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-2 (West 2017).
16. TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7; see also Reply Brief in Support of Motion to
Dismiss for Defs. State Treasurer & Members of the Flint Receivership Transition
Advisory Bd. at 3, Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d
589, 605 (2016) (No. 16-10277) (explaining that “[t]he SDWA applies to ‘owners’ and
‘operators’ of a public water system.”).
17. See Warren, supra note 1, at 62–63 (noting that as of 2016, all states except
Wyoming have opted for primacy).
18. TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7, 13 (discussing Sections 1444 and 1414 of the
SDWA); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3 (West 2017) (codifying Section 1414 of the
SDWA and reflecting 2016 amendments that clarified and expanded notice
requirements); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-3 (West 2017) (codifying Section 1444 of the
SDWA).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8 (West 2017).

1334

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

In theory, then, there is both delegation and accountability in the
SDWA regime, as the model of cooperative federalism requires:
localities must report testing data and noncompliance to the states,
and the states must report such information to the EPA.20 Both
federal and state governments can bring informal or formal
enforcement actions, and the EPA retains the right to cancel its
delegation of primacy to a state and become the primary enforcer of
federal drinking water law in a state.21 In theory, the involvement of
three levels of government in the problem of drinking water
contamination guards against failure at any one level of government.
As a number of federalism scholars have argued, having multiple and
even redundant sources of government regulation can help ensure
that an objective is achieved, since failure by one or more sources can
be checked by others.22 In an ideal world, the SDWA regime would
work such that, if localities failed to meet their responsibilities, there
would be distinct checks: the states and, if the states failed to act as
checks, the federal government.
But in practice the SDWA regime does not operate at all like that,
even though there are of course some federal, state, and local officials
who work hard to safeguard the quality of drinking water and real
improvements have been made in many localities. In actuality, to
lesser or greater degrees in different parts of the Unites States, the
SDWA regime resembles a collective abdication, rather than a
cooperation, regime.23
The federal government abdicates its
20. ERIK OLSON & KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, WHAT’S IN YOUR WATER? FLINT AND BEYOND 13 (2016) [hereinafter
NRDC Report]; TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7.
21. For an example of the EPA threatening to exercise that right, see generally
Lillian Reed, State Could Lose Authority to Monitor Drinking Water, EVENING SUN
(Feb. 20, 2017, 1:50 PM), http://www.eveningsun.com/story/news/2017/02/17/statecould-lose-authority-monitor-drinking-water/97596042/
[https://perma.cc/2QP5PWUU].
22. See generally William Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005) (explicating the argument for redundant
enforcement authorities). The flip side of redundancy, arguably, is a lack of
accountability, as each level or source of government can blame another for
unpopular action or inaction. See David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Federal
Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (explaining the nonaccountability critique of
blurring the roles of different levels of government, but also noting that “there is
evidence that some voters do not carefully distinguish among federal, state and local
governments,” but rather vote based on their general levels of satisfaction with
“government”).
23. For an argument that abdication by states of responsibilities to localities is a
broad phenomenon crossing many areas of federal law, both constitutional and
statutory, see Weinstein-Tull, supra note 6, at 841 (“Much federal law regulates the
conduct of states. States, in turn, delegate many of their federal responsibilities to
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responsibility for safe drinking water, essentially leaving the states
and localities on their own.24 The states—or at least some of them—
then abdicate their responsibility for safe drinking water, leaving the
matter to the localities. Finally, some localities abdicate their
responsibility to provide truly safe water to the owners and operators
of public water systems. As a result of this three-step abdication,
some water consumers, especially in poor and rural communities, are
deprived of something we should all agree they deserve as citizens of
a comparatively wealthy nation, if not simply as human beings—water
that is safe to drink.25 Nor has there been effective citizen suit
litigation to check the abdication by federal, state, and local actors.26
Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the SDWA regime radically departs from
the ideal-type of cooperative federalism.

local governments. This Article argues that states do more than delegate those
responsibilities; they abdicate them. They do not monitor local compliance with
those laws, they disclaim responsibility for the actions of their local governments, and
they relinquish the legal capacity to bring their local governments into compliance.”).
Weinstein-Tull is addressing contexts where the law is reasonably clear that states
have primary obligations under federal constitutional or statutory law but
nonetheless lean heavily on the argument that localities should be the subject of any
litigation brought by advocacy groups or aggrieved citizens. In the SDWA context,
however, states (at least arguably) lack any primary legal obligations under federal
law, so the abdication problem is not one merely of rhetoric and political argument,
but rather is a problem in the law itself. See id.
24. To be fair to the EPA, it repeatedly has threatened states with removal of
their primacy under SDWA, but the threats are just that, as the EPA currently lacks
the resources to fulfill the role of the states as enforcers and regulators, however
inadequate some states are in these roles. See, e.g., David E. Hess, DEP Lacks
Resources to Enforce Minimum Federal Safe Drinking Water Regulations, PA.
ENVTL. DIG. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2017, 6:16 AM), http://paenvironmentdaily.blogspot.com/
2017/01/epa-dep-lacks-resources-to-enforce.html
[https://perma.cc/8GN8-657A]
(highlighting repeated empty threats from the EPA and the corresponding
inadequacy of the state agency’s ability to remedy problems). But see, e.g., Press
Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Awards $100 Million to Michigan for Flint
Water Infrastructure Upgrades (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/epa-awards-100-million-michigan-flint-water-infrastructure-upgrades
[https://perma.cc/FB33-ELM2] (showing scenario in which funding was provided by
federal agency to assist state agency in regulatory capacity).
25. See generally Warren, supra note 1, at 51–70 (documenting failures of SDWA
regime).
26. See infra Part V.
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Figure 1. Expectations of Cooperative Federalism and the
Corresponding Realities of Abdication
Cooperative Federalism
Effective federal oversight of states
as regulators and localities as
regulated entities
Effective state oversight of localities
as regulated entities
Localities as compliant regulated
entities
NGOs/citizen groups checking
federal, state, and/or local failures

The Abdication Trap
Federal abdication to states

State abdication to localities
Localities’ failure to comply with
regulation
NGOs unable to check failures

There is abundant evidence of abdication at all levels. Indeed, no
one seems to contest the proposition that, at least as regards lead in
water, the legal regime fails to fulfill its theoretical promise. One
starting point for unpacking the pattern of abdication is the EPA’s
1991 Lead and Copper Rule (“LCR”), which was intended to
prescribe testing for and responses to lead in drinking water in
approximately 68,000 public water systems nationwide.27 From the
outset, however, the LCR has been criticized as setting too low an
action level for lead in water; for providing for too little and too
infrequent testing for lead; for leaving too much discretion to local
water authorities as to how, when, and where to test for lead; and for
leaving too much discretion to authorities regarding corrosion control
treatment.28 Despite twenty-five years of intensive criticisms and
near universal agreement among public health experts that the LCR
is inadequate, the EPA has been unable to enact a stronger version of
the LCR.29 The EPA itself has recognized the many flaws of the
LCR, and has agreed that there is a need for “clear and robust revised
sampling requirements, strengthened reporting, [and] transparency

27. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12.
28. See generally Brady Dennis, The EPA’s Lead-in-Water Rule Has Been
Faulted for Decades. Will Flint Hasten a Change?, WASH. POST (May 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/epas-lead-in-water-rule-hasbeen-faulted-for-decades-will-flint-hasten-a-change/2016/05/04/8d25bb12-0de9-11e6bfa1-4efa856caf2a_story.html?utm_term=.7604819be849
[https://perma.cc/4Y29U5LH] (summarizing these criticisms and tracing the history of the Rule); see also
NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12–13 (discussing failures in the Rule and
recommending reforms).
29. See Dennis, supra note 28 at 1, 3.

2017]

LEGAL REFORM AFTER FLINT

1337

provisions that ensure consumers have rapid access to relevant
information and public education materials.”30
A recent report on lead in water by the Natural Resources Defense
Council (“NRDC”) documents that, even within the terms of the
LCR, there is gross non-enforcement.31 As the NRDC explains,
based on the EPA’s own violations and enforcement database, “in
2015, over 18 million people were served by 5,363 community water
systems that violated the Lead and Copper Rule,” including failures
to test for lead.32 In 2015, too, “1,110 community water systems
serving 3.9 million people showed lead levels in excess of 15 parts per
billion (ppb)”—the federal action level—“in at least 10 percent of the
homes tested.”33 The geographic scope of LCR violations and lead
level exceedances is “extraordinary.”34
Moreover, the EPA database very substantially understates the
problem; as the NRDC explains, “NRDC has documented
underreporting problems in the EPA’s drinking water database for 25
years,” and “the EPA itself admits that ‘audits and assessments have
shown that violation data are substantially incomplete.’”35 Even
those violations that are documented are rarely subject to formal or
informal enforcement actions, leading the NRDC to conclude that
there is a “lack of accountability [that] sends a clear message to water
suppliers that knowingly violate the Lead and Copper Rule, with state
and federal complicity: [t]here is no cop on the beat.”36
A USA Today investigative report, also drawing on the EPA’s
database, identifies almost 2000 water systems spanning all fifty states
where testing has shown excessive levels of lead contamination over

30. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAD AND COPPER RULE REVISIONS WHITE
PAPER 4 (2016) [hereinafter EPA WHITE PAPER]. Whether the EPA under the
Trump Administration will continue to call for revisions to the LCR, however, is not
yet clear. But cf. Mae Wu, How Trump’s Budget Drains Drinking Water Protections,
NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (June 19, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/how-trumpsbudget-drains-drinking-water-protections [https://perma.cc/H6Z2-5WHD] (noting
statements made by the administration and the current funding and policy priorities).
31. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12–15.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE, NATIONAL PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS COMPLIANCE REPORT 3 (2013),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/sdwacom2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9CE-R34R]).
36. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 6.
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the past four years.37 The water systems, which reported lead levels
exceeding EPA standards, collectively supply water to 6 million
people.38 The investigation also found that at least 180 of these water
systems failed to notify consumers about the high lead levels, as
federal rules require.39 It bears noting that the USA Today reporting,
like the NRDC report, is based on the EPA’s database of violations,
but we know that localities sometimes do not test for compliance or
report violations to the states, and states sometimes do not report to
the EPA.40 Indeed, as of June 2016, two years after the complaints of
contamination began, the State of Michigan still had not officially
reported to the EPA that Flint was in violation of the LCR.41
Experts agree that local water authorities have many tools
available to them to avoid effective testing. “[I]f [the utility] want[s]
to be clever, [it] can test when [it is] pretty sure there’s not a problem
and not find a problem.”42 The result is that the existing sampling
protocol, even when it is nominally followed, can miss “high lead
levels and potential human exposure.”43 The methods used to avoid
adequate testing are various, including intentionally testing at sites
where lead contamination is least likely and running water or flushing
toilets before testing.44 In many small water authorities that often

37. Alison Young & Mark Nichols, Beyond Flint: Excessive Levels Found in
Almost 2000 Water Systems Across All 50 States, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2016),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/03/11/nearly-2000-water-systems-fail-leadtests/81220466/ [https://perma.cc/9AHW-BV54].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 14; Warren, supra note 1, at 68.
41. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 7.
42. Dennis, supra note 28 (quoting Erik Olson of NRDC); see also Garrett
Ellison, Why Michigan Lead Reforms Don’t Call for Even Lower Action Level,
MLIVE (Apr. 22, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/04/
michigan_lead_10ppb.html [https://perma.cc/UB4L-ZCDQ] (quoting Virginia Tech’s
Marc Edwards, to the effect that the EPA rule “has been diluted by . . . loopholes and
utilities which ‘cheat’ and sample in a way that avoids” finding a violation of the
federal standard). As Edwards explains, “[y]ou can focus on a number, but as we saw
in Flint, the number is meaningless if you’re not sampling in the right places.” Id.
43. See Dennis, supra note 28 (quoting Tom Neltner of Environmental Defense).
44. The EPA addressed these various “cheating” methods in a recent
memorandum. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Ground Water & Drinking
Water, Memorandum on Clarification of Recommended Tap Sampling Procedures
(Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/
epa_lcr_sampling_memorandum_dated_february_29_2016_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H9N4-BKWB].
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lack anything like the staff or expertise to do testing, there is not even
a pretense of undertaking testing.45
The pattern of abdication is also evident in federal and state
funding for localities seeking to upgrade infrastructure in order to
improve water quality—or, to be more precise, the gross inadequacy
of such funding. The text of the SDWA could be read to suggest that
the federal government will bear seventy-five percent of the cost of all
necessary infrastructure for clean water, with the states making up the
difference.46 But Congressional appropriations have, in fact, never
been anything close to meeting that target for funding to the states.47

45. As a USA Today investigative report showed, the federal and the state
governments de facto allow very small local water authorities to ignore the SDWA
altogether, apparently out of a recognition that these authorities simply lack the
capacity to do much of anything. See Laura Ungar & Mark Nichols, 4 Million
Americans Could Be Drinking Toxic Water and Never Know, USA TODAY
(Dec. 13, 2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/12/13/broken-systemmeans-millions-of-rural-americans-exposed-to-poisoned-or-untested-water/94071732/
[https://perma.cc/W7HZ-2BPX] (reporting that “[s]ome 4 million Americans get
water from small operators who skipped required tests or did not conduct the tests
properly, violating a cornerstone of federal safe drinking water laws. The testing is
required because, without it, utilities, regulators and people drinking the water can’t
know if it’s safe. In more than 2,000 communities, lead tests were skipped more than
once. Hundreds repeatedly failed to properly test for five or more years.”). It bears
noting that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development also has
abdicated responsibility for lead in water as it affects federally-funded housing,
claiming that any responsibility rests with the EPA. See generally Emily A. Benfer,

Contaminated Childhood: The Chronic Lead Poisoning of Low-Income Children and
Communities of Color in Federally Assisted Housing, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 493

(2017).
46. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42467, LEGISLATIVE
OPTIONS FOR FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (2016). Even with the Trump
Administration’s emphasis on infrastructure, it is clear that this interpretation of the
SDWA will not find traction anytime soon. See Press Release, The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Works to
Rebuild America’s Infrastructure (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2017/08/15/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-works-rebuild-americas
[https://perma.cc/QY22-ETLZ] (“Government will get out of the way to allow state
and local governments to succeed at meeting their unique challenges. Only 1/5 of
infrastructure spending comes from the Federal Government, the vast majority
comes from the states, localities, and the private sector.”)
47. COPELAND, supra note 46, at 5–6; Warren, supra note 1, at 67–68; see also
DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 126 (2d ed. 2004).
With the passage of the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act
(“WIFIA”) in 2014, Congress authorized the creation of the WIFIA program, which
was intended to support water infrastructure projects through financing of loans, but
Congress did not appropriate funding to the EPA for these loans until December of
2016. See Paul Epstein, Water Act a “WIIN” for Infrastructure, SHEARMAN &
STERLING, LLP (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.shearman.com/en/newsinsights/
publications/2017/01/water-act-a-wiin-for-infrastructure
[https://perma.cc/U6UUMWD8]. With appropriations since December 2016 granting the WIFIA program
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Neither the federal government nor (generally) the states have
provided localities with anything like the funding they would need to
address problems of lead contamination.48
II. WHY DO WE OBSERVE ABDICATION?
Why do local water authorities fail to properly test for lead in
drinking water, and even when they do test, why do they fail to report
test results and take appropriate remedial action? At the local level,
economies of scale are sometimes a problem, because some water
authorities are so small it is not reasonable to believe that they will
ever have the staff and sophistication to assess and address problems
of lead in their water.49 But for all local water authorities, there are
strong incentives not to learn about problems with lead in their water.
Simply testing for lead can cause concern among water users, who
otherwise might not ever know to raise the issue of lead in water.50
Moreover, testing for lead can result in demands that the problem of
lead be remediated, which can be very expensive—so expensive that
$25 million in budget authority, the EPA invites eligible entities to apply for “$2.3
billion in WIFIA loans to help finance $5.1 billion in water infrastructure investments.”
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, How to Apply for WIFIA Assistance: Notice of
Funding Availability, https://www.epa.gov/wifia/how-apply-wifia-assistance#notice
[https://perma.cc/AG8W-VTP5]. This amount, however, will not put a dent in the
expected cost of necessary water infrastructure projects. See infra notes 58–65 and
accompanying text.
48. See COPELAND, supra note 46, at 5 (“Perhaps the most critical concern is the
fact that federal capitalization grants [for water quality projects] are entirely subject
to appropriations, which generally have been flat or declining for more than a
decade . . . .”); NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 21 (“Current congressional funding
of $2.37 billion per year for water infrastructure falls far short of the enormous need.
This investment must be substantially increased, to at least the approximately $8
billion per year stipulated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009.”). The budget proposed by President Trump would entail no increase in
annual funding to states to improve water infrastructure, and it calls for a reduction
in funds for federal oversight. See generally Sarah Frostenson, Trump’s Budget
Cripples the EPA’s Ability to Keep Drinking Water Safe, VOX (Mar. 17, 2017),
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/16/14640972/budget-epa-enforcementbad-drinking-water-trump [https://perma.cc/S5EH-6SJP].
49. For an extended discussion of the great difficulties of small water authorities
in meaningfully complying with federal and state drinking water regulations, see
SCHEBERLE, supra note 47, at 124–53. As Scheberle explains, an unquestionable
problem with SDWA is that it seeks to apply the same regulatory regime to water
authorities that vary dramatically in size. Id. at 136–38. The EPA has taken some
actions to encourage very small local water authorities to consolidate, but the agency
plainly has no authority to require that.
50. See Dennis, supra note 28 (quoting one Illinois water-operations manager as
stating “[w]hen you do extensive sampling like this, you have to explain why, when in
fact there might not be any problem . . . . No one wants to hide anything from
anyone, but the PR factor is something that has to be dealt with.”).
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imposing the costs of remediation on water users might seem
practically impossible and, at best, extremely problematic.51 The local
governments, of which local water authorities are a part or with which
they are affiliated, have budgets that are already exhausted through
the meeting of basic needs like police and schools. In financially
strapped localities, there are no additional funds available for a
response to any identified water quality problems that would not also
mean politically problematic reductions in other, extant funding.
Thus, it is simply better for local authorities not to know.
Most managers of local water authorities—most local officials—
presumably do not want to think of themselves as responsible for
exposing people to lead poisoning in the communities for which they
work. Given the strong incentives of local water authorities to
believe that their water is safe, it is unsurprising that they can also
believe that avoiding testing (or avoiding accurate testing) is simply a
pragmatic, harmless way to avoid needless entanglements with
uncomprehending customers and officious state and federal
bureaucrats.52
One possible way to understand abdication at the federal and state
levels is as reflecting a normative view on the part of state leaders that
local water quality is simply an issue for localities, as well as a
normative view on the part of federal leaders that local water quality
is an issue for the states and localities. These “it’s-a-state” or “it’s-alocal” problem views runs contrary to the text of the SDWA: the
SDWA is an incomprehensible statute if, in fact, drinking water
quality is not a subject of federal or national concern. So, too, state
drinking water statutes and regulations are incomprehensible if
drinking water is solely a matter of local concern. Nonetheless, these
views that “it’s-a-state” or “it’s-a-local” problem do have some
traction in political discourse, and may have some sway in the federal

51. See id. (highlighting a statement from Tom Neltner of Environmental
Defense Fund that “[u]tilities have no incentive to find the problem. That’s not a
good rule”); see also Malcom Duncan & Aja Brown, Opinion, Commentary: Flint
Shows the Need for Innovative City-State Partnerships, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN
(Mar. 15, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/opinion/commentaryflint-shows-need-for-innovative-city-state-partnerships/ouNGQlwdCCQytUGtesPI9
O/ [https://perma.cc/DE34-ZC9A] (explaining that poorer cities like Waco, Compton,
and Flint realistically need state assistance and partnership to address public health
and other problems they face).
52. See SCHEBERLE, supra note 47, at 140–47 (reporting the views of state water
agency officials regarding the EPA). Scheberle’s interviews of water managers
suggest that they believe that they are doing a fully adequate job protecting public
health, but that federal bureaucrats simply focus on non-existent problems and/or do
not understand how water systems work in practice. See id.
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or state political process. For example, these views were expressed by
some in Congress in explaining their opposition to additional funding
for Flint.53 At the same time, even if one believes that basic human
health and welfare are not a national concern, but rather something
that should be left to the state and locality where any particular
American lives, the social costs of lead poisoning do not stop at the
boundaries of localities or states.54 Moreover, a belief in a limited
role for the federal government or state government does not explain
why federal and state abdication appears to be more marked in the
context of lead in drinking water quality than in some other contexts.
Another possible normative force behind abdication could be the
view that public service lines made of lead are connected to private
service lines made of lead.55 To solve the problem of lead
contamination, both public and private lead service lines need to be
replaced. Further, partial replacement (of public lines only) could be
even worse than no replacement, depending on how carefully the
partial replacement is undertaken.56 There is a real issue as to how
53. See, e.g., Phillip Wegman, Here’s Why Mike Lee Opposes Federal Aid For
Flint, DAILY SIGNAL (Mar. 7, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/03/07/heres-why-

mike-lee-opposes-federal-aid-for-flint/
[https://perma.cc/9ZVM-HJE5];
Press
Release, Heritage Found., Senate WRDA Bill Creates New Programs, Lacks
Reforms (Sept. 7, 2016), http://heritageaction.com/press-releases/senate-wrda-billcreates-new-programs-lacks-reforms-s2848/
[https://perma.cc/5CHB-M3LZ]
(claiming that drinking water issues are “best handled by state and local
institutions”); see also CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS 184 (1995)
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/
1995/9/104-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LXC-VNUC] (“Federal ‘one-size-fits-all’
regulations not only impose unnecessary costs on providers of drinking water; they
also force localities to devote resources to minor problems, which leaves fewer
resources for major ones. Localities, not Washington, should determine their own
standards and how to meet them.”). But see WIIN Act, 114 Bill Tracking S. 612,
LEXISNEXIS (Jan. 25, 2017) (showing ultimate passage in the House of
Representatives, 360-61, and in the Senate, 78-21).
54. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 3, 11; Peter Muennig, The Social Costs
of Childhood Lead Exposure in the Post–Lead Regulation Era, 163 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 844, 844 (2009) (“Reducing blood lead levels to
less than 1 g/dL among all US children between birth and age 6 years would reduce
crime and increase on-time high school graduation rates later in life. The net societal
benefits arising from these improvements in high school graduation rates and
reductions in crime would amount to $50,000 . . . per child annually[.]”)
55. EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 9.
56. See Darryl Fears & Brady Dennis, One City’s Solution to Drinking Water
Contamination? Get Rid of Every Lead Pipe, WASH. POST (May 10, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/one-citys-solution-todrinking-water-contamination-get-rid-of-every-lead-pipe/2016/05/10/480cd842-081411e6-bdcb-0133da18418d_story.html?utm_term=.01224541d9c7
[https://perma.cc/
ZDS4-R8T3]; see also Michael Hawthorne & Peter Matuszak, As Other Cities Dig
Up Pipes Made of Toxic Lead, Chicago Resists, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 21, 2016, 7:12 AM),
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best to divide financial responsibility for infrastructure upgrades
between public and private actors, and how to deal with the problem
of private owners who simply lack the funds to finance private line
replacement.57
This private property problem, however, cannot plausibly justify
federal, state, and local abdication as to testing and disclosure, which
would at least allow private owners to know if they have exposure to
lead contamination. Moreover, there is a strong argument that the
dividing line between public and private service lines is largely
arbitrary and should not dictate the scope of public responsibilities.58
And many residents, such as renters and the children and guests of
owners, may not even own the residences to which private lead
service lines run.59 As a normative matter, too, it is not clear why
even adult owners, who are less at risk of being harmed from lead
exposure, should be subject to the risk of lead poisoning simply
because they cannot readily afford to replace private service lines.60
Federal and state abdication as to drinking water testing and
treatment, then, does not seem to be readily explicable by normative
conceptions regarding the proper boundaries between federal, state,
and local governments, or between the public and the private sectors.
Rather, federal and state abdication seems most explicable by raw
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-lead-water-pipes-funding20160921-story.html [https://perma.cc/FAK3-JLU9].
57. See EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 9.
58. Indeed, some members of an advisory group to the EPA have suggested that
the EPA revise its rules to require a local water authority to replace both publicly
and privately owned portions of water lines that are under effective control of the
water authority. See LEAD & COPPER RULE WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT OF
THE LEAD & COPPER RULE WORKING GROUP TO THE NATIONAL DRINKING WATER
ADVISORY COUNCIL 18 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201701/documents/ndwaclcrwgfinalreportaug2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BV9-BZWV].
59. States have only recently begun to make available information to residents
regarding whether pipes leading to their homes contain lead. See generally Grading
the Nation: Interactive Map, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/health/gradingnation-lead-pipe-disclosure-polices-map [https://perma.cc/7THB-PUKM] (grading
states in terms of how much information they make available).
60. The EPA, in fact, has pointed to several cities that have successfully resolved
the question of public-private responsibility in undertaking service line replacements.
See EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 9 (“To the extent water systems rely on
homeowners to pay for replacement of privately-owned portions of lines, there are
concerns about consumer’s ability to pay and the possibility that lower-income
homeowners will be unable to replace lines, resulting in disparate levels of protection.
However, a number of cities and towns across the nation have successfully
implemented full LSLR and have developed innovate approaches to addressing these
challenges, including Lansing, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin; and more recently,
Boston, Massachusetts—and EPA is looking at this experience in the context of
developing proposed revisions to the LCR.”).
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politics. That is, to appropriate a sum that would meaningfully
address lead contamination, politicians would have to expend more
political capital than would be gained by the ultimate abatement of
lead in the nation’s water.
The status quo of underfunding supports the system in which each
government actor has two choices: point fingers at each other or bury
its head in the sand. State officials do not press localities to test and
report because they know localities will call upon states to pay for
necessary responses, and most state legislatures have not allocated
money for such work.61 Federal officials do not press states to
enforce, or localities to test and comply with testing and reporting
guidelines because they know that states and localities will call on the
federal government to pay for the necessary responses, and Congress
has not allocated the funding for an appropriate response.62 At the
end of the day, federal and state abdication is a story of money—or
the absence of it.
The magnitude of the funding absence is not small. Lead can leach
from lead pipes including public service lines and the private service
lines that connect homes and other buildings to the public lines.63
The most comprehensive solution to the problem of lead in water
would be the replacement of all public and private lead service lines,
combined with special abatement and public health protections in
place to guard against the contamination that can result during the
replacement of the lines.64 Short of wholesale replacement, and until
it is completed, rigorous maintenance of road and sewer
infrastructure, use of proper corrosion control chemicals in water, and
public education are needed. Altogether, solving the problem of lead
in water could cost upwards of $300 billion dollars.65
61. See Warren, supra note 1, at 74–75.
62. See id. at 76; see also Guha, supra note 10.
63. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 6; see Lead Pipes: A Threat to Kids Across
America, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/health/lead-pipes-threat-kidsacross-america [https://perma.cc/FXZ3-CCE6].
64. California has, in fact, at least adopted a goal of full replacement of lead
service lines, although even there the question remains whether there will be
sufficient funding. See Tom Neltner, California Requires Replacement of All Lead
Service Lines—But Vigilance Needed on Implementation, ENVTL. DEF. FUND:
HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/health/2017/01/19/californiasb1398-on-lsls/ [https://perma.cc/BZ4G-QE2F].
65. Estimates vary as to the costs of lead pipe replacement, but the sum involved
would seem to be at least $300 billion. See Matthew Dolan, U.S. Could Face a $300B
Lead Pipe Overhaul, Agency Warns, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 5, 2016, 6:14 PM),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/03/04/flintcrisis-could-cost-us-300b-lead-pipe-overhaul-agency-warns/81316860/
[https://perma.cc/D9G8-K2DG].
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Three hundred billion dollars is a great deal of money, but
Congress and state legislatures could appropriate that amount over
the period of a number of years to achieve complete lead abatement.
Although there are many models and abundant scholarship regarding
the appropriation process, there is no question that it is a highly
political process. Legislators and political party leaders, at least in
part, make the decision to support one funding item over another
based on the expected political gains and political costs of their
decisions.66 The pattern of grossly inadequate funding for water
infrastructure at the federal and state level—a pattern that drives the
triple abdication—reflects the fact that federal and state legislators do
not see sufficient political gain in pushing for more funding.
And that political calculation makes sense because lead
contamination in water, generally, does not seem to be a politically
salient issue. It is not an issue that drives people to organize, march,
donate money or, most importantly, vote. Before Flint, and aside
from Flint, lead in water does not make the news, with few
exceptions.67 It is not invoked at party conventions.68 It is not the
stuff of large protests and letter-writing campaigns.69
Lead

66. See generally D. Roderick Kiewiet & Mathew D. McCubbins, Congressional
Appropriations and the Electoral Connection, 47 J. POL. 59 (1985) (testing and

supporting an instrumentalist view of legislative votes regarding funding). For
further background discussion on the underlying theory and the corresponding
implications of cognitive psychology, see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747,
748–49 (1990) (“We seek to identify how, in a democratic society, public attitudes
about risk might influence the kinds of risk regulation programs that will be enacted,
given that political officials, in their quest for electoral security, seek to satisfy the
preferences of constituents. . . . We choose to proceed on the assumption that while
cognitive theory accurately describes how citizens make decisions about risks to life
and health, traditional decision theory can be aptly applied to the political actor’s
problem of calculating the best response to citizen demands for action.”).
67. Pre-Flint, however, there was a steady stream of scientific, non-popular press
articles exploring harms from lead and possible solutions and their costs. See
generally Rebecca Renner, Reaction to the Solution: Lead Exposure Following
Partial Service Line Replacement, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A202 (2010)
(exploring whether partial replacement of lead service lines was a viable solution).
68. The Flint crisis did prompt the Democratic Party to address water
infrastructure in its 2016 platform, but the Republican platform continued to ignore
the issue. See Andrew Farr, GOP, Democratic Platforms Present Contrasting Visions
for Infrastructure, WATER FIN. & MGMT. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://waterfm.com/gopdemocratic-platforms-present-contrasting-visions-infrastructure/
[https://perma.cc/3BU9-AAVZ].
69. One exception is the protest following a 2004 Washington Post article
regarding the risk from lead in water. See Joseph Foti, Lead in Our Water—A
Washington, D.C. Mystery, WORLD RESOURCES INST.: INSIGHTS BLOG
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contamination has not even been prominent in academic discourse of
environmental justice.70
But why is there not political agitation around—and corresponding
demand for political action to address—the problem of lead in water?
There are at least two plausible reasons. First, the lack of political
capital targeting the issue of lead in water may reflect, in part, the
issue’s availability and its effect on voters’ predictions that they will
suffer from lead contamination in their water supply. Lead in water is
invisible and tasteless.71 Its effects may go unnoticed, and even when
people do notice the effects, they may not attribute them to lead
contamination. The water in Flint attracted residents’ attention not
because of lead, per se, but because of other contaminants that made
the water brown and may have caused rashes and other immediate
effects.72 Moreover, the populations most vulnerable to the effects of
lead in water—poor, minority, or geographically isolated
populations—tend to be less capable than other populations of
garnering attention that translates into political salience, in part
because of their lack of resources to invest in politics and in part
because of classism, racism, and other prejudices.73

(Mar. 21, 2008),
http://www.wri.org/blog/2008/03/lead-our-water-washington-dcmystery [https://perma.cc/C87M-RJE5].
70. For example, I could not locate any article in the Westlaw secondary journals
database addressing the Federal Lead and Copper Rule as a problem of
“environmental justice” prior to 2016. The most prominent environmental justice
articles in the legal scholarship have focused on the siting of polluting facilities or
waste disposal facilities in low-income, minority neighborhoods. See generally Vicki
Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993). Such facilities,
unlike lead in drinking water, are highly visible to local populations.
71. See Young & Nichols, supra note 37.
72. See Abby Goodnough et al., When the Water Turned Brown, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/us/when-the-water-turnedbrown.html [https://nyti.ms/2k5axs2] (recounting reactions to brown tap water); see
also Nives Dolšak & Aseem Prakash, It’s Not Just Flint: Here’s Why We Ignore
Water Pollution, WASH. POST (June 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/08/flints-contamination-and-victorias-secrets-hereswhy-we-ignore-water-pollution/?utm_term=.f16a0fc43f58
[https://perma.cc/UA24DEUW] (“Of course, water is key to human existence. But one important insight is
that water pollution is not visible and therefore is overlooked. Citizens tend to focus
on problems they can see and experience.”).
73. See Dolšak & Prakash, supra note 72 (“If you are disadvantaged and face
pollution problems, you are in jeopardy twice over, as the vast literature on
environmental justice makes clear. The Flint contamination problem in part reflects
income and racial disparities; city and state-level officials didn’t have the incentives to
respond sufficiently to complaints about water quality. This is a visibility issue, too —
people may be invisible as well as problems.”); see also EPA WHITE PAPER, supra
note 30, at 17; NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 16–17.
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Flint is exceptional in how politically salient it made the problem of
lead in drinking water. There may be localities around the country
with lead levels in water comparable to Flint’s (until recently)
extremely high levels. We know there are many localities with far too
much lead in their drinking water.74 But several aspects of the Flint
story made it exceptionally gripping for the media: the state’s unusual
role under emergency powers;75 how Flint’s water became
contaminated despite the traditional use of, and close proximity to, a
completely safe water source;76 the grotesque incompetence of the
water managers who ignored the need for corrosion control, and
egregious lying on the part of government officials;77 the heroism of a
local pediatrician in insisting that children were being poisoned;78 and
the state’s intransigence, dismissiveness, and callousness even after
the problem had come to light.79 Flint garnered media attention of a
sort that one cannot imagine other localities receiving. And thanks in
large part to this media attention, Flint has led to some political
mobilization to address lead contamination in Michigan and
elsewhere.80 But we cannot expect (and would not want) there to be
more stories like Flint to keep pressure up for action on lead. As the
press turns away from Flint, and time passes, the Flint effect on the
politics of lead is likely to dissipate.

74. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 5 (“Flint is not alone: over 18 million
people were served by systems violating the Lead and Copper Rule in 2015.”).
75. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39–42 (explaining the role of the
state’s emergency powers).
76. See Warren, supra note 1, at 77–78 (“For most, the shift to the Flint River was
obviously ill advised before it occurred in April 2014.”).
77. This conduct has given rise to criminal indictments. See Paul Egan & Elisha
Anderson, 5 Michigan Officials Face Manslaughter Charges Over Flint Water Crisis,
USA TODAY (June 14, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/
06/14/flint-michigan-prosecutions/396195001/ [https://perma.cc/U2SM-Y7ZP]; see
also NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 4.
78. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 10; Sanjay Gupta et al., ‘Our Mouths
Were Ajar’: Doctor’s Fight to Expose Flint’s Water Crisis, CNN (Jan. 22, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/health/flint-water-mona-hanna-attish/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ZN67-MG36].
79. Indeed, it has been argued that the outrageousness of the Flint story is its
distinctive and legally salient feature. See Toni Massaro & Ellen Brooks, Flint of
Outrage, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 114–18 (discussing state reforms in the
wake of Flint); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing federal
legislative action).
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP (OR LACK THEREOF) BETWEEN
INFORMATION, POLITICAL MOBILIZATION, AND LAW
As Luke Cole argued years ago during the first wave of
environmental justice literature, the project of achieving
environmental justice requires more than talk, and more than law on
the books. It requires political mobilization and political pressure.81
Even if we had much better federal regulations and even if the EPA’s
famously inadequate LCR was finally revised after years of talk about
such a revision, there would still need to be the political will to
support real enforcement and remediation of the problem. Hence,
the question that deserves attention, but cannot so readily be
answered is: how can the problem of lead in water be made and kept
more politically salient, such that there would be the political will for
sustained action?
Better, more readily accessible, and more vivid information about
who is exposed to lead in water would make the problem of lead
more salient to those affected and could help foster and sustain
political mobilization to address reducing lead exposures through
government-funded infrastructure projects and other initiatives.82
But to get better testing and more effective disclosure, there needs to
be some political will in the first place to institute and enforce laws
requiring better testing and more effective disclosure. For those
concerned about the problem of lead in water, legal reform aimed at
testing and disclosure may be more politically feasible than reform
aimed at expensive, wholesale replacement of lead service lines. And
the former kind of legal reform, in turn, ultimately may make it
politically feasible to secure government funding for the latter (much
more expensive) kind of reform.
The goal, then, is to create a kind of feedback loop on the way to
full resolution of the problem of lead in water. Political mobilization,
perhaps spurred by Flint, allows for reforms in law that result in the
production of better information, which produces more political
mobilization, which reinforces and even extends legal reform, which
produces even better information, which produces more political

81. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection:
The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619, 648 (1992); Luke
W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 541 (1994). See generally Noll & Krier, supra note 66, at

767–68.
82. And, even if that was not successful, better information would at least allow
families to take self-protective measures such as running taps or buying and using
filters.
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mobilization, which ultimately becomes powerful enough to deliver
the funding necessary for the infrastructure changes that are needed
to safeguard public health. Admittedly this scenario is theoretical,
but this is a moment when, broadly speaking, legal reform regarding
issues of lead in water seems plausible, as evidenced by Governor
Snyder’s proposed new drinking water regulations in Michigan and
the recent passage of legislation in Ohio, Illinois, and California.83
The question then, is: what shape should this reform take?
IV. LEGAL REFORM AS INSTITUTIONAL RE-DESIGN: MOVING
AWAY FROM COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Whatever the substance of testing and disclosure rules for lead
should be, rules only matter if they are enforced, and we have seen a
pattern of non-enforcement of the rules we already have. In the
current regulatory regime, there are two sets of regulators and
enforcers (the federal and state governments) and one set of
regulated entities that are legally responsible for testing for and
disclosing the presence of lead, and for treating drinking water if
there is a violation (localities or local water authorities). The regime
should be re-designed to expand the role of the federal government
or state governments to make them primarily liable as regulated
entities with respect to drinking water, as opposed to simply being
regulators and enforcers. The expansion of legal responsibility could
be total in theory, covering both testing, disclosure and treatment, or
partial, covering only testing and disclosure. Since the role of
localities is crucial for testing and treatment, the question then is
whether the federal government or state governments should share
that responsibility as co-legally-responsible actors, not whether sole
responsibility should vest in the federal or state governments.
Figure 2 shows some options for institutional re-design.

83. See Jim Lynch & Michael Gerstein, Snyder Plans Renewed Push for Stricter
Lead Limit, DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 13, 2017, 12:07 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/

story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2017/02/13/snyder-plans-renewed-push-stricterlead-water-limit/97828670/ [https://perma.cc/7BCU-9LN5]; James F. McCarty, New
Ohio Law Requires Mapping of Lead Pipes, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Oct. 12,
2016),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/10/new_ohio_law_requires_
mapping.html [https://perma.cc/58YR-GQFL]; Tom Neltner, California Requires
Replacement of All Lead Service Lines—but Vigilance Needed on Implementation,
ENVTL. DEF. FUND: HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/health/
2017/01/19/california-sb1398-on-lsls/
[https://perma.cc/6HXM-TKMU];
Sophia
Tareen, Rauner Signs Lead Testing Law for Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2017, 8:30
PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-rauner-school-lead-testing-law-201701
16-story.html [http://perma.cc/9U6K-W6WP].
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Figure 2. Legal Responsibility of Government Entities for
Implementation in Institutional Re-Design
Government
Entity
FEDERAL
STATE

SDWA Regime

LOCAL

Sole responsibility

Fully shared with
state

NGO/CITIZEN
GROUP

Suits against local

Suits against state
and local

Oversight
Oversight

“Radical Shift”
Design
Oversight
Fully shared/joint
with local

“Moderate Shift”
Design
Oversight
Shared/joint with
local in testing and
disclosure
Shared/joint with
state in testing and
disclosure
Suits against state
and local

In theory, one could imagine a federal law that made the federal
government directly responsible for testing for lead and disclosing
risks at the local level, and perhaps even for treatment.84 But any
proposal for such a statute would be greeted with claims that it
represents a heavy-handed approach to a realm traditionally left to
state and local governments. And, politics aside, direct testing for
lead by the federal government may not be the most efficient
approach, given the geographic distance between the federal
government and the tens of thousands of localities where testing
needs to be done.
A more plausible approach would be changes at the state level, as a
matter of state law, whereby states legally assume responsibility,
jointly with local water authorities, for drinking water testing and
disclosure (in the moderate shift alternative set forth in Figure 2) or
for drinking water testing, disclosure, and treatment (in the radical
shift alternative in Figure 2). State legislatures would certainly flinch
at the radical option for budgetary reasons alone, so in the current
political climate the moderate shift is the most conceivable option.
One might ask, why would we expect state employees tasked with
testing for lead in water to act with any greater fidelity to the law than
local water authority employees? One reason is that localities have
an even more immediate incentive to engage in avoidance than states
do, as localities are currently the only entities legally responsible for

84. See generally David A. Dana & Deborah Turkheimer, After Flint:
Environmental Justice as Equal Protection, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 93 (2017) (suggesting

that there are possibilities for addressing problems like Flint under the broad
conceptual rubric of federal Equal Protection).
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addressing the problem—and they are, in theory at least, legally
responsible for addressing the problem regardless of whether they can
obtain federal or state funding.85 Moreover, criticism from consumers
as a result of any identified problem will be directed immediately at
the local water authority and at the state only secondarily, if at all.86
In addition, making states legally liable for testing and disclosure
may change the psychology of state legislatures to some degree. State
legislators may feel that, given their legal responsibility, they must at
least appropriate adequate funds for testing and disclosure. Legal
liability for testing also may change the psychology of state water or
environmental agencies.
The bureaucracies might feel more
empowered, to the extent they were already inclined to act, to address
possible lead problems, because state legal responsibility for testing
and disclosure would provide them some measure of rhetorical
protection against claims by local actors that they were being
overbearing or unduly intrusive. Even for state bureaucracies that
are otherwise disinclined to address problems of lead in water, the
possibility that they will be criticized publicly for failing to meet not
only a regulatory oversight duty, but also a substantive legal duty to
engage in testing and disclosure, might be enough to motivate them to
devote resources to verifying representations by local water
authorities regarding testing and disclosure, and to step in when local
water authorities have not met applicable requirements.
This shift to shared responsibility by the state could be configured
in a variety of ways to fit the political, economic, and physical
circumstances in each state. The obligation by the state could be to
test and disclose for all water authorities, to do so only for small and
low-income localities where the risk of inadequate testing seems
highest, or to audit local testing and disclosure practices, report the
audit results, and then test in localities where audits showed local
noncompliance.
In this reconfigured regime, local authorities still would be legally
responsible for, and hence empowered to, test alongside the state, and
thus would be able to determine if the testing proposed by the state
85. Nothing in SDWA’s text preconditions operators’ legal duties on the
availability of federal or state funding. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-27
(West 2017).
86. For consumers, their direct point of contact regarding drinking water is their
local water authority and local government. That is the entity, most notably, that
sends them water bills and informs them of any issues with water service, such as
interruptions to service. It is only natural, therefore, that citizens would tend to voice
their complaints to their local water authorities and local governments, and to blame
them for any problems.
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was inadequate. Localities could engage in more testing than the
state on its own would deem adequate. The story of Flint illustrates
why such local input is important, because there, the state managed
Flint’s water under emergency powers in a way that sidelined local
control and acted with less regard for local welfare than local leaders
might have had they retained effective control.87 Failure to meet
legal responsibilities is a risk for both state and local officials, which is
why making them co-responsible, as a legal matter, is an attractive
option.
Cara Cunningham Warren has recently suggested that a more
collaborative, mutually respectful, more “polyphonic” kind of
federalism may be what is needed to address the problem of lead in
water.88 But it is unclear how calls for greater collaboration among
different levels of government will lessen the problem of triple
abdication. Re-configuring legal responsibility to make states coliable for testing and disclosure may have more impact than attempts
to boost collaborative attitudes within the current cooperative
federalism design—a design that, in the context of drinking water, has
not worked all that well.
So far, none of the reforms proposed or adopted at the state level
in the wake of Flint entail an acceptance of testing and disclosure
responsibility on the part of a state, exclusively or shared with local
water authorities—with one arguable exception. The Flint Task
Force Report recommends the implementation of “a school and
daycare water quality testing program (which could serve as a model
for the United States), administered collaboratively by [the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality] and [the Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services] that includes
appropriate sampling and testing for lead contamination for all
schools and daycare centers in the state and effective reporting of test
results.”89 It is unclear whether Michigan’s Governor’s proposed
reform package adopts this recommendation, or even if it does,
whether such a program will actually be instituted. But if adopted
and implemented, it would reflect a partial institutional re-design,
87. See Claire Groden, How Michigan’s Bureaucrats Created the Flint Water
Crisis, FORTUNE (Jan. 20, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://fortune.com/flint-water-crisis/

[http://perma.cc/B3XX-6V3F] (noting that “detractors of the [state emergency
powers] law say that the lack of democracy in Flint prevented the city from making
careful decisions,” and quoting one NGO leader as arguing that “[w]hen you remove
all democracy, it’s a system set up for failure, where they’re not accountable to the
people that they’re serving . . . ”).
88. See Warren, supra note 1, at 113–14.
89. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13, 59.
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marking the first time a state would be the legally responsible actor
for testing the drinking water supplied by publicly-owned local water
authorities, albeit in a limited category of sites.90
V. THE ROLE OF CITIZEN SUITS
One of the possible benefits of making states legally responsible or
co-responsible for testing and disclosure, is that doing so may make
citizen suits more effective as a means of combatting abdication in our
drinking water regime. There have been relatively few citizen suits
under the SDWA,91 and unlike in other statutory areas of
environmental law, the SDWA law has not been notably shaped by
the courts via citizen suit litigation.92 There could be many reasons
for the lack of SDWA or related state litigation: drinking water, for
example, may not be as compelling an issue for environmental NGOs
and their memberships, which have traditionally been focused on
preserving offshore water quality and water quality in lakes and
streams, and have been somewhat slow to turn their attention to the
problem of poor, urban communities.93
Citizen suit litigation also is a clumsy tool for citizen groups given
the current allocation of responsibility in our drinking water regime.
Under current law, citizen groups are more or less limited to suing
local water authorities for noncompliance,94 but the local water
authorities that are most noncompliant are also likely to be the ones
that lack resources to improve compliance, precisely because their
noncompliance may reflect their lack of resources to take on
infrastructure improvements. These localities can argue to courts,
90. In addition, a bill has been introduced in the Indiana Legislature that would
require the state to assume responsibility for testing for lead in drinking water in the
City of East Chicago, a city where shocking levels of lead soil contamination, lead
building materials contamination, and lead contamination in the drinking water have
been documented. See generally H.R. 1344, 120th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017).
91. See Christine L. Rideout, Where are All the Citizen Suits?: The Failure of
Safe Drinking Water Enforcement in the United States, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 655, 679
(2011) (discussing the paucity of citizen suit litigation under the SDWA).
92. See id.
93. See Elizabeth Miller, Part One: Environmental Groups Slow to Seek Out
Minorities, WXXI NEWS (Sept. 25, 2017), http://wxxinews.org/post/part-oneenvironmental-groups-slow-seek-out-minorities [https://perma.cc/U69M-THU6].
94. See Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d 589, 604–
05 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (holding that state officials could be sued under SDWA in Flint
because they had taken over control of the water system from local officials, but
acknowledging that otherwise state officials could not be sued under SDWA, as they
would be “immune from suit from the requirements of the SDWA because they are
not responsible as a ‘supplier of water,’ since they do not ‘own[ ] or operate[ ] a
public water system.’”).
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powerfully, that they simply lack the staffing and funding to do much
better. Moreover, a suit against a single local water authority by
definition can only have an impact, if any at all, on the local area in
question. To have broad impact, citizen groups would have to sue
many local water authorities, which would mean many lawsuits or
sprawling, unwieldy, multi-defendant lawsuits. Such litigation would
necessarily entail high transaction costs, and citizen groups
themselves typically have very limited resources they must try to
leverage to produce the most benefit.
Under the current legal regime, a citizen suit usually can only be
brought by residents against the owner or operator of a local water
authority where that resident lives.95 It is owners and operators that
are the legally responsible actors under the SDWA, and the
implementing state law.96 Although there are at least a few successful
SDWA citizen suits against states, these cases entailed unusual
circumstances.97
Generally, citizens face standing and merits
problems in suing a state under the SDWA, because local authorities
have primary obligations as regulated entities, whereas a state’s
obligations are merely those of a regulator.98 As a regulator, a state
presumptively has broad discretion to decide when and when not to
take action regarding noncompliance on the part of local water
authorities.
However, if, as a matter of state law, the state was legally
responsible for testing for lead and for disclosure of test results, the
state could be regarded as an “operator” of local water authorities
under the SDWA, at least with respect to testing and disclosure
operations.99 States also could then be sued under state-version
95. See id at 597.
96. See id at 604–05.
97. I searched Westlaw for published citizen suit decisions against a state under
the SDWA citizen suit provision, and the only examples I found relate to 42 U.S.C.
§ 300j–24, which is unusual in imposing a direct obligation upon a state, to the effect
that “[e]ach State shall provide for the dissemination of information regarding lead to
local educational agencies, private nonprofit elementary or secondary schools and to
day care centers . . . .” See generally Acorn v. Edwards, 842 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. La.
1993) (holding that citizen groups had standing to sue the state for an alleged
violation of § 300j–24); Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Romer, 796 F. Supp. 457 (D. Colo. 1992)
(upholding fee award to environmental plaintiffs in suit alleging violations of § 300j24).
98. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text (explaining that states act as
regulators under the SDWA when they assume primacy over implementation and
enforcement).
99. See generally United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (holding that a
parent corporation can be held liable under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act as operators of a facility owned by a
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administrative procedure acts for failing to comply with nondiscretionary duties to test and disclose.100 Figure 2, above, shows the
shift regarding citizen suits with a partial, moderate re-design of the
SDWA regime.
Suits against states could be very effective in checking any
abdication by states with respect to testing and disclosure
requirements. In such suits, citizen groups could collect a great deal
of information in a highly efficient way through discovery, since the
state being sued, by definition, would have information about what
testing and disclosure it undertook for all the local water authorities
under its purview. As compared to a local water authority, a state
could much less convincingly argue poverty and lack of resources to a
court in response to a citizen suit.101 Additionally, such suits would
create a forum in which citizen groups and the state could negotiate
as to where it would be most rational for testing and disclosure
resources to be invested.
A single settlement agreement
encompassing a state thus could yield much greater net public health
benefits than a handful of suits against local water authorities.
Suits by citizen groups against states for failing to test children
enrolled in the Medicaid program for lead poisoning provides
something of a model for the kind of litigation citizen groups could
bring against states for failing to test drinking water and provide
disclosure. There is a history of Medicaid suits in which advocates
pressed for a state to expand and improve its lead testing procedures
(although the suits were generally aimed at other deficiencies in the
state’s Medicaid program as well).102 A 1991 settlement of a suit

subsidiary if the parent corporation directed waste management decisions at the
facility).
100. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, which many states follow,
provides for review of final agency action and further provides that “[a] court may
compel an agency to take action that is unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed.” REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 501(d) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2010).
101. Of course, there are some states that are financially strapped (such as Illinois,
at present), but state budgets are always going to be an order of magnitude greater
than the budget of any local water authority and thus will appear to have more room
for funding compliance with a court order. Moreover, at the end of the day, local
water authorities and localities generally are limited by state law and regulation as to
their unilateral ability to impose new taxes or rate increases to fund compliance with
a court order. By contrast, States qua States have greater latitude in generating new
sources of funding. See Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal
Taxing Authority and What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 301 (2016).
102. See, e.g., Ellis ex rel. Ellis v. Wetherbee, No. 96-60434, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
43306, at *2 (5th Cir. May 5, 1997) (discussing the State of Mississippi’s prior
settlement agreement to change the policy and procedures of its Early and Periodic
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against California required California to test at least 500,000 poor
children for lead poisoning, after three years of failing to do so in its
Medicaid clinics.103 Most recently, after a settlement, all children in
Washington covered by Medicaid will be eligible for lead-poisoning
testing if their parents request it, they live in old buildings, they are
recent immigrants, or they face other exposure risks.104 In addition,
the State of Washington committed to make available a new online
map that lets residents zoom in on their neighborhoods, down to
census tracts, to see their relative risk of lead exposure ranked on a
scale of one to ten, based on income levels and age of housing.105
VI. MAKING LEAD CONTAMINATION INFORMATION SALIENT
There is a consensus among commentators that, regardless of who
is responsible for testing for lead in water, there must be changes to
the substance and procedures for testing.106 For one thing, the federal
action level for finding “too much lead” must be lowered from 15
parts per billion (ppb) to a lower level that reflects the actual health
risks posed by lead.107 Michigan’s Governor has proposed lowering
the standard to 10 ppb, which would be the lowest of any state.108
Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (“EPSDT”) program); Memisovski ex rel.
Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 WL 1878332, at *49 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23,
2004); Thompson v. Raiford, No. 3:92-CV-1539-R, 1993 WL 497232, at *2 (N.D.Tex.
Sept. 24, 1993); N.Y.C. Coal. to End Lead Poisoning v. Giuliani, 720 N.Y.S.2d 298,
299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
103. See Philip J. Hilts, California to Test for Lead Poisoning, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12,
1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/12/us/california-to-test-children-for-leadpoisoning.html [https://perma.cc/XM5Z-WURL].
104. Sandy Doughton, More Children Will Be Tested for Lead Under Settlement,
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015, 3:27 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/health/more-children-will-be-tested-for-lead-under-lawsuit-settlement/
[https://perma.cc/UZR4-XHDA].
105. See id.
106. See Dennis, supra note 28.
107. See Tom Neltner, Household Action Level for Lead in Water: EPA Needs to
Release Health-based Estimate, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: HEALTH BLOG (Mar. 25, 2016),
http://blogs.edf.org/health/2016/03/25/lead-hal/ [https://perma.cc/5EEF-6YVU]; see
also Laura Unger, Lawmakers Urge the EPA to Reduce Its Standard for Lead in
Drinking Water, USA TODAY (July 1, 2016, 10:23 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/2016/06/30/lawmakers-urge-epa-reduce-its-standard-lead-drinking-water/
86576032/ [https://perma.cc/8LTS-DSSA].
108. See Chad Livengood, Snyder Proposes Tougher Regulations for Lead in
Water, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/04/15/michigan-urge-toughest-lead-testrules/83071228/ [https://perma.cc/52TR-Z6BG] (“The proposal appears to be ‘the
lowest state standard in the country,’ said Doug Farquhar, program director for
environmental health at the National Conference of State Legislatures.”); see also
Ellison, supra note 42 (quoting Virginia Tech’s Marc Edwards as explaining that
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Moreover, testing must be done more frequently and expansively in
each locality, and with fewer possibilities for manipulation, if the data
is to have any integrity.109
For information about lead in water to matter, both in influencing
people’s personal behavior and in politics, it must be salient to
people—it must be something they can readily access, understand and
integrate. Dry, technical information available in a form letter or
buried in a report on file with a government office will not be
effective in communicating to people the need to take action.110 In
other words, for testing and disclosure to increase political salience,
the public disclosure itself must be salient to the intended audience:
residents, community members, and the media.
It seems obvious that salience presupposes at least ready
availability: the easier the information is to access, the more salient it
may be, whatever its form. The available social science also suggests
that salience of disclosure is enhanced when it takes the form of
graphics or other visual representations: a bright flashing warning
light may be more effective than numbers or text stating that a test
shows a contaminant level exceeds federal or state action levels.111
Risk communication is also more effective when the recipient of the

advocates believe the standard ideally should be 5 ppb, but acknowledge that the
costs of achieving that standard would be too high given other demands for public
funds).
109. To this end, the EPA’s National Drinking Water Advisory Council has
recommended “that a voluntary customer-initiated sampling program based on a
more robust and targeted public education be substituted for the current LCR tap
sampling requirements.” EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 13.
110. The EPA White Paper recognized the need for more effective communication
with the public. See id. at 15 (“EPA is considering modifications to the rule to
strengthen the public education requirements by requiring ongoing, proactive and
targeted public education to effectively communicate drinking water lead risks . . . ”).
111. Dolores J. Severtson & Jeffrey B. Henriques, The Effect of Graphics on
Environmental Health Risk Beliefs, Behavioral Intentions, and Recall, 29 RISK
ANALYSIS 1549, 1549–50, 1563 (2009) (“Findings show moderately strong positive
relationships between water test results, safety beliefs, and mitigation behavior . . . .
[A] test result compared to a safety standard provides concrete evidence of an unseen
risk and is therefore more powerful than abstract risk information . . . . Graphical
representations can make abstract information more concrete and have been
recommended for conveying environmental monitoring information as it relates to
safety standards or benchmarks . . . . Typically used phrases such as ‘exceeds the
standard’ or ‘above the standard’ were sometimes misunderstood . . . . Visualization
can make information easier to understand . . . . The strategic use of evidence-based
visual features can address literacy and numeracy barriers by facilitating automatic
comprehension . . . . Results suggest that images designed to convey the meaning of
risk information can close the gap between the intended and imparted meaning of
environmental health risk information.”).
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information is offered a depiction that shows how close he or she lives
and works to sites where tests have shown contamination.112
Recent and proposed reforms in lead testing of water might
enhance the salience of disclosures to some degree. These reforms
need to be actually implemented and strengthened to ensure that
better testing for lead produces not just more information, but more
impact on the recipients of the information and, ultimately, greater
political salience.
The LCR does not require any testing for lead at the ninety
percent of schools or day care centers that receive water from a public
water system.113 In the wake of the uproar over Flint, Michigan’s
Governor has proposed annual testing at schools and day care
centers, and recently enacted legislation in Ohio and Illinois require
such testing.114 Such testing, of course, is plainly sensible, as schools
and day care centers are potential exposure sites for children. But the
testing data from schools and day care centers is also notable because
it is likely to be more salient in communities than data from selected
individual homes. A letter sent to your home regarding testing at a
number of houses in the general community—but not at your house—
is much more readily overlooked than a notice that the water at your
child’s school has a level that violates the federal standard.
Moreover, notices to parents about such data can spark conversations
and mutual exchanges among parents and educators, so that even
parents who might not understand or pay attention to notices can
come to appreciate what they mean. Neighborhood schools, which
often have established parents’ groups and large meeting spaces, are

112. See, e.g., Dolores J. Severtson & James E. Burt, The Influence of Mapped
Hazards on Risk Beliefs: A Proximity-Based Modelling Approach, 32 RISK

ANALYSIS 259, 259–60 (2011) (“The use of maps to communicate environmental risk
to the public is rapidly expanding . . . . Maps illustrate the geographic distribution of
risk, a key advantage over other formats of risk information. Viewers can see how
the location of their home or community is configurationally related to mapped
information . . . . Participants’ beliefs about risks associated with the hazard (risk
beliefs) were strongly influences by participant’s perceived map locations relative to
the distribution and magnitude of the mapped hazard.”).
113. Laura Unger, Lead Taints Drinking Water in Hundreds of Schools, Day Cares
Across USA, USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2016/03/17/drinking-water-lead-schools-day-cares/81220916/ [https://perma.cc/
UH4W-3EEE].
114. See Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Bill Analysis, H.B. 512, 131st Gen.
Assemb., at 5–6, https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=5070&format=pdf
[https://perma.cc/V95E-DCGF]; Lynch & Gerstein, supra note 83; Sophia Tareen,
Rauner Signs Lead Testing Law for Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2017, 8:30 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-rauner-school-lead-testing-law-20170116story.html [http://perma.cc/6XUQ-C4B4].
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natural focal points for community organizing, including organizing
for action regarding the problem of lead.
No jurisdiction has moved toward a highly salient way of depicting
lead testing results, such as an interactive map that would show how
close or far testing sites are from one’s own home and how much the
results at each site exceeded the legal limit for lead. For its part, in its
October 2016 White Paper, the EPA reported that it was considering
“[r]equiring drinking water utilities to post all LCR sampling results
and sample invalidation justifications on their publicly accessible
website in a form that protects the privacy of customers.”115 But the
EPA has not taken any action in this regard, and neither have the
states.
The EPA, however, has called on local water authorities to map
what they know regarding the location of public and private lead
service lines, and to make those maps available to the public.116 Ohio
has taken the lead in this regard. A recent Ohio law, enacted in June
2016, requires that “every public water system in the state identify
and map the locations of lead piping in their entire service areas.”117
Public water authorities in Ohio have been given discretion as to how
to achieve mapping, and at least one—Cincinnati—has undertaken it
in a way that is well-designed to make the information as available
and vivid, and hence salient, as possible.118 Cincinnati chose to follow
the approach already in place in Washington, D.C., which makes it
easy for a resident to check whether his or her residence is connected
to a public service line containing lead by using a detailed online
map.119 The map also allows the resident to see whether there is
information indicating that the private service line for his or her home
also contains lead.120 All a resident needs to do is enter his or her

115. EPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 15.
116. See generally Alison Young, Some States, Utilities Balk at Disclosing
Locations of Lead Water Pipes, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2016, 4:20 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/04/21/lead-water-service-line-locationtransparency/83201228/ [https://perma.cc/TH9F-ZW8E] (explaining that the response
from local water authorities has been variable).
117. Peak Johnson, Ohio Requires Mapping of Lead Pipes in Water Systems,
WATER ONLINE (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.wateronline.com/doc/ohio-s-requiresmapping-lead-pipes-water-systems-0001 [https://perma.cc/8UYU-NPNP].
118. See Tom Neltner, Cincinnati and Ohio Show Leadership in Identifying and
Disclosing Lead Service Lines, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://blogs.edf.org/health/2017/01/09/cincinnati-and-ohio-show-leadership-on-lsls/
[https://perma.cc/Y88B-MAAZ.]
119. Id.
120. Id.
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address.121
Cincinnati, again following the Washington, D.C.
approach, invites customers to submit updated information to the
utility by email.122 As one commentator notes, “[t]his level of detail
allows any consumer to make informed choices whether they are
buying or renting a home, picking a child-care facility, or deciding
whether to use a filter.”123 Figure 3, below, is a screen shot of the
widely-praised interactive map used in Washington, D.C., in which a
green dot signifies a lead-free service line; a grey dot signifies a lead
service line; and a white dot indicates a lack of information as to
whether the line contains lead.124
Figure 3. Map of Public Service Lines in Washington D.C.125

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Lyndsay McCormick, Mapping Lead Service Lines: DC Water Offers a Model
for Utilities Across the Nation, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: HEALTH BLOG (July 25, 2016),

http://blogs.edf.org/health/2016/07/25/mapping-lead-service-lines-dc-water-offers-amodel-for-utilities-across-the-nation/ [https://perma.cc/9SKX-WZQD].
125. Id.; see DC Water Service Information, D.C. WATER, https://geo.dcwater.com/
Lead/ [https://perma.cc/VS8M-4WWM].
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While there have been a few improvements in making information
regarding lead testing more salient to affected residents, and hence
more likely to form the basis of meaningful personal and political
action, there is still much more that could be done. Most states do
not have testing at schools on a regular basis or at all; test results are
not communicated in accessible maps; and effective mapping
regarding the location of public and private lead service lines is in
place in some, but by no means most, jurisdictions. Even if states did
accept greater legal responsibility for testing, and if testing were to
improve, the issue of lead in water may not gain political salience
unless there is more effective, more salient disclosure of test results.
CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis builds on the recognition that our regime
for drinking water regulation entails a triple abdication—by the
federal and state governments as regulators and by local authorities
as regulated entities serving water consumers. A lack of political
salience surrounding the problem of lead in water best explains this
abdication. This Article proposes an institutional re-design (making
states directly, legally responsible for testing and disclosure) as well as
a change in testing disclosure (making it more accessible and vivid) as
ways to heighten the political salience of the lead problem and
perhaps make possible the kind of federal and state funding needed
to fully address it.
This approach depends on legislative and regulatory action at the
state level, and the political climate in some states may make that
impossible. However, while it is true that states sometimes engage in
races to the bottom, other times there are races to the top with states
copying best practices adopted elsewhere. We could see such a
phenomenon regarding lead in water.126 If nothing else, should one
or more states adopt a “model” state-based regime with effective
testing and disclosure, advocates in other states could point to that
model as part of their own advocacy. Moreover, if a number of states
adopted the strategy proposed in this Article, it might change the

126. See generally Lincoln Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There
“A Race” and Is It “To The Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3 (2011–

2012). In addition to the reforms noted in Michigan, Ohio, Illinois and California,
there are bills being introduced in various state legislatures where lead in water is
clearly a problem, such as Pennsylvania. See Paul Vigna, Flint ‘Tragedy’ to Prompt
Pa. Legislation That Requires More Testing for Lead, PENN LIVE (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://www.pennlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/02/legislation_would_increase_lea.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/G7NS-JKSV].
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political economy at the federal level to make it more likely that
Congress would amend the SDWA and require states to share testing
and disclosure responsibilities with localities in return for federal
infrastructure funding.127
This approach also relies heavily on the power of information, and
informational approaches have their limits. Particularly for otherwise
distressed communities, more information simply may not be
something they have the wherewithal to fully absorb and act upon.
Conversely, information about health risks can also prompt
overreactions or non-adaptive reactions—such as not running one’s
tap at home except when absolutely necessary because of a fear of
lead, which has the effect of increasing lead concentrations in the
water that one does use.128 Public education can address the problem
of such reactions, and that too has to be part of the response to the
problem of lead in water.129
Continuing with our current regime is simply not a tenable option,
because lead is one clear danger we can identify and eliminate. Too
little has been done to address the problem of lead in water under the
current institutional design, so a re-design is needed, not just a
tweaking of current rules. In re-designing the regime for lead
contamination in water, moreover, we may gain a better
understanding of how to address the broader problem of abdication
in environmental law.

127. Notably, state actors in states that already had assumed responsibility for
testing at the local level might not lobby their Congressional delegation against a
federal mandate; indeed, they might feel that if they are accepting that responsibility,
other state governments should too.
128. For a discussion of the need to take account of how people will react to
information about risks in order to improve health and safety in situations like Flint,
see Sarah Stillman, Can Behavioral Science Help In Flint?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 23,
2017), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/23/can-behavioral-science-helpin-flint [https://perma.cc/QG7S-W6E3].
129. Public education efforts are now underway in Flint, although efforts there are
impeded by the understandable lack of trust on the part of the public. See Elisse
Ramey, Mayor, CORE Workers Hope to Ease Concerns for Flint Residents, ABC 12
(Mar. 15, 2017, 1:18 PM), http://www.abc12.com/content/news/416214843.html
[https://perma.cc/RL8A-CVV4]; Stillman, supra note 128.

